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Compared with Britain, welfare reform in the United States has relied less on
incentives and more on administrative work tests. Parallel to welfare reform,
American states have begun requiring men to work who owe child support or are on
parole from prison. Evaluations of men’s work programmes to date are encouraging,
but implementing these programmes is demanding. The federal government should
promote their further expansion and evaluation. Britain has yet to take serious steps
in the same directions.
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Introduction
In Britain, the recent election has installed a
new government, but the struggle to reform
welfare and get more adults to work is less
likely to see dramatic change. That effort goes
back to the previous Conservative government,
and it was the major domestic initiative of the
recent Labour government. But despite some
valuable developments, progress has been
slow. The number of unemployed claiming
support from government dwindled in the
early 2000s, but has recently soared to nearly
1.5 million with the recession. The number of
lone parents claiming support has fallen below
700,000, but the number on incapacity
benefits has remained well above 2 million.
Overall, the number of Britons of working age
living off government has continued to grow
and is today close to 6 million.1 The Labour
government aspired to raise the share of
working-aged people who actually worked to
80%, but the level has remained well short of
that.2
What is the problem? Allowance must be
made for the current recession, which has
made jobs less available than formerly.
Government, also, has found no easy answer
to the rise in disability claimants, even though
a large minority of these appear more
unemployed than incapacitated, especially in
the north of England where jobs are scarcest.3
However, to someone involved in
American social policy, the British approach
to welfare and work also has clear weaknesses:
• A preoccupation with poverty traps: Most
analyses of welfare in Britain that I have
read assert that a major reason for
dependency is the disincentives to work
and family created by welfare itself. It can
appear that if benefit claimants take jobs
or marry they will lose almost as much
income in benefits as they gain in
earnings.4 But there is no evidence in
American research that these
disincentives affect the actual behaviour of
the poor much at all. Nor do I know of
such evidence in Britain.
• Weak administrative work tests: What
promotes work much more than benefit
changes is administrative demands that
claimants work or seek work as a
condition of aid. The Conservatives’
revival of work tests, Labour’s New Deal,
the creation of Job Centre Plus, and the
recent Welfare Reform Act were all
important steps towards conditioning
benefits more seriously on work. But to
an American eye, British welfare is still
dominated by entitlement, the traditional
idea that people qualify for aid on
objective criteria regardless of lifestyle.
Only after they receive assistance, if at all,
are they pressed to work. Serious reform
means ending entitlement by clearly
imposing work as a requirement for aid.5
Even in disability, some obligations to
prepare for work can be imposed, as the
government has begun to do.
• A fixation on the benefit system: In Britain,
the struggle to raise work levels is largely
confined to welfare reform. Changes in
the benefit system are expected to do the
whole job. But whether employable adults
work or not depends on many other
factors as well. In America, work levels
among the poor are also well short of
optimal,6 even though we have many
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fewer people on benefit in proportion to
our population. So we pursue higher
work levels by other policies, including
those I discuss in this paper. Britain
should do the same.
In American welfare reform, little attention was paid to
disincentives. Benefit reduction rates were improved to reward
people for working. But to get them to go to work, the main
reliance was on strong administrative work tests. These were
far more forceful than in Britain. In some states, working was
effectively demanded even to apply for aid, let alone receive it.7
This despite the fact that reform focused on lone mothers,
whom most Europeans (including Britons) see as among the
least employable recipients. The effort to get them to work
also embraced changes outside welfare – for example, in
childcare, healthcare, wage subsidies and training. The quest
for employment thus was much wider than welfare reform.
The men’s work problem
The problem of low work levels among poor men illustrates
the potential of the American approach even more clearly.8
Efforts to promote work among men have only just begun in
the United States, but they have almost nothing to do with
disincentives or welfare. Rather, they are based on
administrative work tests constructed outside the welfare
system. They can be seen as a second front in the struggle to
get the poor working, alongside welfare reform.
Benefits are hardly in the picture – poor men in America are
not usually eligible for cash aid, and few draw any benefits of
any kind. Yet in 2008, only 42% of poor men worked at all in the
year, only 14% full-time and full-year; the corresponding figures
for the population were 73% and 52%. Among poor men aged
16–50, who are the most expected to work, 51% did not work at
all, 64% among blacks.9 Since non-work lowers income, of
course, it becomes another name for poverty. Employment
among low-skilled men has been low or falling for years, and
even the hot economy of the 1990s – which helped drive welfare
mothers to work – did not improve matters by much.
Falling men’s work levels has been devastating for families.
Men who do not work are unlikely to marry, nor are absent
fathers likely to pay child support to their children unless they
work. Non-work is also linked to crime, drug addiction and
many other social problems. It is devastating, as well, for the
men themselves. For most men, to achieve something as a
worker is essential to self-esteem. Only the man who first ‘cuts
it’ at the workplace is likely also to succeed as a husband and
father. By failing to work regularly, poor men condemn
themselves to failure.
Reasons for non-work
Could the men work more than they do? Prior to welfare
reform, many experts believed that social barriers of various
kinds – benefit disincentives, lack of jobs or childcare, lack of
skills, and so on – made it simply impossible for most welfare
mothers to work. The evidence for this was never strong, and in
the 1990s reform showed that many more welfare mothers
could work than anybody imagined. In general, social barriers
have little to do with whether poor adults work. They have
much more to do with how well they do if they work, with the
educated doing much better than the unskilled. Barriers, in
short, explain inequality much better than poverty.10
Due to that experience, few have seriously argued that
jobless men literally cannot work. Sheer lack of jobs is a far
smaller problem in America than in the depressed areas of
Britain. Rather, economists make the weaker claim that
unskilled men are discouraged from working by low earnings.
Real wages for the unskilled have fallen in recent decades,
apparently leaving non-workers little reason to labour. But it is
unclear whether this should drive work levels lower or higher.
Reduced pay might motivate men to put in more working
hours, rather than fewer, in order to cover their budgets.11 In
any event, higher wages in the 1990s did little to raise work
levels.
Much more clearly, work discipline among low-income
men has deteriorated. Lower wages do not directly reduce
work levels. Rather, both wages and work have been driven
down by the fact that low-skilled men have become less
reliable employees than they once were. Fewer today are able
to show up for work on time, take orders and co-operate with
co-workers. They usually can find jobs, but they tend to be
fired from them or just leave. In part the problem is that many
unskilled men today are in prison for crimes, making them
less employable when they emerge. Many also, if they work,
have their wages reduced to pay child support orders, which
may deter working.12 But the patterns of life that lead to crime
or unwed parenthood also show a loss of social discipline.
As was true for welfare mothers, simply to offer poor men
higher wages, job training or other benefits on a voluntary
basis has little effect on work levels. To reach this group,
evaluations show, employment programmes must be highly
directive, telling their clients that they are supposed to get jobs
and keep them, rather than leaving work as a choice. The best
programmes are also paternalistic – using case managers to
oversee clients closely, both to assist them and to ensure that
they fulfil their obligations to seek work and keep jobs.13
Mandatory work programmes
The best approach for getting men to work is to build
programmes around the obligations to work that some men
already bear. Absent fathers who owe child support must work
to pay their judgments, and ex-offenders exiting the prisons on
parole in most states are obligated to work as a condition of
parole. America currently has 2.3 million people behind bars,
a record number, due to recent efforts to suppress crime. Over
700,000 ex-offenders are returning from prison every year.
That has given new prominence to the problems of poor men.
I estimate that in 2007, 1.2 million American low-income men
failed to meet their work obligations. That is, they failed to pay
all the child support they owed to poor women, or they were
on parole while not working regularly.
Programmes aimed at requiring such men to work have
begun to appear at the state level in the United States. In child
support, the programmes arose to help enforce orders to pay
support. When men fail to pay support they appear before
child support judges. They often claim to lack jobs and
income, but the judges have no way to verify that. If they tell
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the men to get jobs, they cannot determine if they comply. If
they remand them to work programmes, however, that is an
obligation that the men cannot evade. Their compliance can
be monitored and enforced. Now many men will admit to
having jobs and pay up. If they are really jobless, on the other
hand, the programme can help them to work. Evaluations of
programmes like this show that they can raise the share of
men paying child support by as much as half and the share
that works by around 20%.14
In criminal justice, there are prison re-entry programmes
meant to help ex-offenders adjust to regular life after prison,
above all by going to work. In the past, rehab programmes
have generally failed to reduce recidivism, meaning the
commission of new crimes after prison. The best of the recent
work programmes, however, reduce recidivism by 10% to 20%.
They also can raise employment substantially, although to date
they have done so mainly by creating jobs for clients rather
than placing them in the private sector.15
In both child support and criminal justice, the sanction
that enforces participation is ultimately incarceration. In child
support, men who are assigned to work programmes and fail
to show are sent to local gaols for contempt of court. In prison
re-entry, ex-offenders who fail to work or attend work
programmes can be sent back to prison. Those sanctions are
more forceful than anything to do with benefits.
Well-administered, they could raise work levels.
Men’s work programmes arose because society wanted to
get more money out of absent fathers, and it wanted to forestall
new crimes by ex-offenders. But American experts and officials
are starting to view higher work levels as important more
broadly. If poor men did better as workers, they would also do
better as husbands and fathers. Government has found no sure
way to strengthen the family and curb the rise of unwed
parenthood. But welfare reform has taught us how to promote
work among poor women. By doing the same for poor men, we
can strengthen men and reduce poverty. Over time, that should
strengthen the family as well.
Implementing work programmes
Welfare reform began as small experimental work
programmes in the 1980s that evaluated well but were
peripheral to regular welfare operations. Reform began to bite,
in the later 1980s and 1990s, only when these programmes
were implemented widely enough so that the majority of
welfare recipients faced serious pressures to work. Only then
did the nature of welfare change ‘on the ground’. Only then
was entitlement displaced by conditionality. That was the
change that finally drove most welfare mothers off the rolls
into work. Most mothers needing income now went directly
into jobs and bypassed welfare entirely, because it was clear
that in any event they would have to work. These diversion
effects were the most fundamental that reform achieved.
Welfare had to expand administratively to get control of its
caseload. Agencies staffed up so they could supervise cases
more closely, to be sure they took work seriously. They also
had to convince their own personnel that work was a good
idea, so they would enforce it with conviction. Only when the
majority of cases were driven off welfare could the bureaucracy
again shrink along with the rolls. Today, welfare is far smaller
than it was, but by continuing to enforce work it helps to
maintain the work norm, not only on welfare but in the
surrounding society. Even in the current recession, the welfare
rolls have rebounded only slightly.
Men’s work programmes in America today are roughly
where welfare work programmes were 30 years ago. They are
typically small and detached from regular child support or
criminal justice operations. Many are also voluntary; making
no attempt to enforce participation, even though it is clear that
just offering services to poor men achieves little. Without a
requirement, few men with work problems even come forward.
Some ‘fatherhood’ and re-entry programmes have had such
trouble filling their rolls that they had to resort to mandatory
referrals from child support or the parole system. For the
programmes to impact the work problem seriously, they will
have to become much larger and more mandatory, as welfare
work programmes did. Above all, they will have to be
integrated into routine child support and criminal justice
operations.
The key to implementation is that child support and
criminal justice agencies that already deal with poor men
accept work as a central mission, the way welfare did in the
1990s. Right now, neither system typically does this. Child
support assumes that absent fathers are working or could
easily do so, and the main task is to get ‘deadbeat dads’ to pay
their judgments. Only recently has the system realised that
perhaps a third of men simply cannot pay due to their own
employment problems.16 Officials have therefore come to
support work programmes in many states. Criminal justice is
typically less receptive to change. Officials recognise that
whether ex-offenders find jobs quickly is crucial to whether
they stay out of prison, but they see employment as the men’s
responsibility rather than their own. With the current concern
over prison re-entry, however, that attitude may be changing.
State efforts
Efforts to expand work programmes for men are surprisingly
common, although they have been little noticed in
Washington. A survey of most states in 2009 revealed that
almost half had already implemented some kind of work
programmes for child support defaulters. Nearly two-thirds
had done the same for ex-offenders. Some of the efforts were
short-lived due to funding problems. Some drew funding from
welfare, which sees a need to help non-custodial fathers, and
many were run by other federal training programmes.
Interviews in six states during 2008–09 clarified the
political and bureaucratic factors behind whether a state
innovated in this area or not. In many states, welfare reform
had been divisive, as it was in Washington. Advocates and
some politicians resisted the idea of making welfare mothers
work to get aid. The idea of enforcing work on poor men has
generally been less contentious. Elected leaders usually accept
that absent fathers should pay child support, and they will
enforce work to this end. The idea of expanding work
programmes in criminal justice is somewhat more disputed, as
it means releasing more convicts on parole, where they might
commit renewed crimes.
In three of the states visited – New Jersey, New York and
Wisconsin – leaders had not focused on the men’s problem, so
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work programmes were still small and mainstream agency
operations were little affected. In contrast, in the other three
states – Ohio, Michigan and Texas – stronger leadership had
led to major innovations. Michigan has launched an ambitious
criminal justice reform meant to reorient the system away
from incarceration toward re-entry, while in Ohio the prison
agency had paid for work programmes in child support in
order to reduce the number of defaulters being sent to prison.
Most notably, Texas had implemented large-scale work
programmes in both child support and criminal justice and
had evaluated both to show positive effects. The state had
initially implemented welfare reform poorly, but it had learned
from this and done better with the men’s programmes.
Administrators had persuaded the state legislature to expand
the child support programme by stressing the financial gains
to be had from improved child support collections.
Administratively, the key to innovation was that the
affected agencies worked together to address the work
problem. This required that child support develop a common
computer system with the training agency running the work
programme, so that all staffs could track the same cases and
data. This was crucial to monitoring attendance to be sure
men do not give up or disappear. And while child support and
parole already had staffs supposed to oversee their clients,
work programmes required a different kind of case manager –
oriented not to paperwork but to helping the men actually
find and keep jobs out in the field.
Recommendations
Based on current evidence, in either child support or criminal
justice, work programmes for men should be mandatory and
paternalist – requiring participation and using case managers
to enforce it. They should focus on placing men in available
jobs, even if low-paid, rather than training them for better
positions. Since training programmes for this group have
evaluated poorly, the best way to raise wages is through wage
subsidies. To achieve work, especially for ex-offenders, it may
be necessary to create jobs, as employers willing to hire these
men may be insufficient. In welfare reform, in contrast, the
private sector was quite willing to hire most welfare mothers,
and job creation was seldom needed.17
To implement such programmes for the 1.2 million men
estimated above would cost between $1 and $5 billion (£0.7 to
£3.5 billion) a year, based on existing programmes. That sum is
not large compared to the cost of welfare reform. It is also
offset by the added child support that government would
collect and – even more – by the economies it would achieve in
prisons through lower incarceration. With imprisonment at
record levels, some states – like Michigan and Ohio – have
been driven toward work programmes simply as a cheaper
alternative to putting more men behind bars.
These programmes, if well implemented, would enforce
work more effectively on men who are already supposed to be
working. But, as in welfare reform, help should be joined with
hassle. The main men’s problem is to work more reliably in any
available job, but even men who work steadily can be poor due
to low wages. Welfare reform succeeded, in part, because of
expanded wage subsidies given to low-paid workers. The
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) fattened the earnings of low-
paid family heads by as much as 40%. This helped many welfare
mothers to leave aid for work. But EITC pays only a small
subsidy to workers without dependants. That is the situation of
most low-income men, many of whom are absent fathers.
Some have proposed a much more generous subsidy aimed
at low-paid workers generally, with or without dependants.
That would allow unskilled men to make significantly more
than now and give them more hope of supporting families.
Ideally, receipt of this credit would be conditioned on the men
working at least 30 hours a week and paying any child support
judgment they had. The cost would be much more than for
work programmes – in one proposal $29 to $33 billion a year –
because all low-paid workers meeting these conditions would
qualify, not only the much smaller numbers that are obligated
to work.18 Together, the combination of work enforcement and
wage subsidies should do more to get poor men working than
any earlier approach.
Next steps
The evaluation record of men’s programmes is not strong
enough for Washington to mandate them immediately. While
work programmes, if well implemented, could help raise men’s
work levels, they have not yet demonstrated the strong gains
in employment and earnings seen in welfare work evaluations.
Rather, national policy should promote cautious expansion of
these programmes at the state level while conducting further
evaluations to learn more about them.
Since 1975, Washington has funded most of the cost of
state child support operations in an attempt to recoup the cost
of paying welfare to the families that fathers had abandoned.
States, however, are not currently allowed to use this funding
for child support work programmes. To ease that restriction is
the main thing Washington could do to expand work
programmes for men. In criminal justice, the federal role has
always been much smaller. Here, the main federal funding is
closed-ended project grants, and that is sufficient for now.
The other thing Washington must do is commission more
high-quality evaluations of men’s programmes. Of the existing
evaluations, only two are of the highest quality – experimental
designs involving random assignment of clients between the
tested programme and a control group.19 Other studies have
used quasi-experimental designs, and some programmes
reported only how well their clients did, without any
comparison to equivalent men not in the programme to prove
an impact. Thus, men who went through a programme often
emerged with higher work or education levels than before, but
we do not know that they would not have done so on their own,
without the programme.
In welfare reform, a string of high-quality, experimental
evaluations in the 1980s and 1990s were crucial to establishing
that welfare employment programmes worked and how best to
design them. These studies made clear that the programmes
should be mandatory, not voluntary, and that a policy of work
first – placement in available jobs – achieved more than
education and training. In men’s programmes, it is already
clear that mandatoriness and work first are best, but other
issues are unresolved – such as whether creating jobs is really
necessary, if so how to create them, and how large
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programmes should be relative to all the men who are
obligated to work yet do not do so reliably.
Implications for Britain
Despite substantial efforts, Britain still has not fully
implemented welfare reform. Due to the New Deal and other
measures, work tests for the unemployed are now moderately
serious, but requirements for lone mothers and the disabled are
still inchoate. The demands are still short of the level that
would trigger diversion – people going directly to work without
going on aid at all.
Nor is there much sign of any effort to get men to work
outside welfare. In child support, the system has not got
beyond simply collecting support from absent fathers, a task it
finds sufficiently challenging. In criminal justice, minor
offenders can be made to do community service, but the aim is
more to repay a debt to the community than to promote work
as an end in itself. Some offenders can be remanded to training
programmes, but the focus is more on skills than work in
available jobs.
Any effort to promote men’s employment would no doubt
face stiffer questions about job availability than America has
faced, particularly in the North. Non-workers might have to be
moved to the South before they could reasonably be expected
to work, or jobs might have to be created for them. Whether
the benefits of enforcing work outweighed the costs would be
less clear than in America. But a broader effort to enforce work
outside welfare should be seriously considered.
We have to stop thinking about dependency or non-work
mainly as economic problems, as we are prone to do. That
tendency is all the stronger today because of the fiscal deficits
threatening all affluent countries. Rather, assuming jobs exist,
enforcing work, on either men or women, poses mainly
administrative challenges. Laws must be passed and
programmes funded, but to achieve work requires, above all,
the building of local institutions. Benefit administrators and
the staffs of work programmes must collaborate to make clear
to recipients that they can receive aid only if they work.
Politics may finally be even more important than
administration. America learned from welfare reform that the
threat of losing benefits was not sufficient to get many
mothers to go to work. Faced with that demand, many left
welfare without working. In an affluent society, there are many
ways for poor families to survive, even without either welfare
or work.20 To get more poor adults to work, either men or
women, will also take social pressures, beyond any programme
or policy. It has to become clear that society demands work for
the employable as a condition of citizenship, and elected
leaders must express that demand. Work levels will rise when
employment for the employable is once again seen as among
the common expectations of the society.
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